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  One consequence of the trade and technology driven increases in skill premia in the 
older industrial regions since the 1980s has been a perceived “skill shortage” in those regions, 
along with freer migration of skilled and professional workers from developing regions.  
While skilled migration flows remain too small to have large short-run effects on labour 
markets, a further opening to skilled migrants by the industrialised North could see substantial 
changes in labour markets and overall growth performance.  The links between demographic 
change, migration flows and growth performance are here explored using a new demographic 
sub-model that is integrated with an adaptation of the GTAP-Dynamic global economic model 
in which regional households are disaggregated by age and gender.  Skilled migration flows 
are assumed to be motivated by real wage differences to an extent that is variably constrained 
by immigration policies.  A uniform relaxation of these constraints has most effect on labour 
markets in the traditional migrant destinations, Australia, Western Europe and North America, 
where it restrains the skill premium and substantially enhances GDP growth.  The skill 
premium is raised, however, in regions of origin, and particularly in South Asia, although the 
extent of this is shown to depend sensitively on the responsiveness of skill acquisition to 




  Rising skill premia in industrial labour markets in the 1980s and 90s sparked a 
substantial literature on the effects of expanded trade with developing regions and the 
development and transmission of skill-using technological change.
1  These changes have 
coincided with declining fertility in the older industrialised regions and a transition in Europe 
and Japan to labour force decline.
2  They are further complicated by even more rapid fertility 
decline amongst educated families, from whence emerge the children with the greatest 
potential for skill-acquisition.
3  Taken together, these trends have brought forth “skill 
shortages” in those regions, along with policy changes that have allowed freer migration of 
skilled and professional workers from developing regions. 
While skilled migration flows remain too small to have large short-run effects on 
labour markets, a continued opening to skilled migrants by the industrialised North could see 
substantial changes in labour markets and overall growth performance.  In this paper the links 
between demographic change, migration flows and growth performance are explored using a 
new demographic sub-model that is integrated with an adaptation of the GTAP-Dynamic 
model of the global economy, in which regional households are disaggregated by age and 
gender.  Skilled migration flows are assumed to be motivated by real wage differences to an 
                                                 
1 See McDougall and Tyers (1997), Berman, Bound and Machin (1998) and Tyers et al. (1999). 
2 See Bongaarts and Bulatao (2000), McDonald and Kippen (2001), Lee (2003). 
3 **** Papers that establish that educated fertility decline has been faster.   3
extent that is variably constrained by immigration policies.  A uniform relaxation of these 
constraints has most effect on labour markets in the traditional migrant destinations, Australia, 
Western Europe and North America, where it restrains the skill premium and substantially 
enhances GDP growth.  The skill premium is raised, however, in regions of origin, and 
particularly in South Asia, although the extent of this is shown to depend sensitively on the 
responsiveness of skill acquisition to regional skill premia. 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 discusses the construction of the matrices 
of inter-regional migration flows that are essential to the modelling.  Wage divergences that 
motivate migrants are then discussed in Section 3 and the full demographic and economic 
models used are described in Section 4.  Next, the preparation of a base line projection for the 
global economy that incorporates full demographic change is discussed in Section 5.  This 
projection is compared in Section 6 with others that allow more responsiveness to real wage 
divergences.  Conclusions are then offered in Section 7. 
 
2. Constructing the Initial Global Migration Flow Matrix 
  Migration records are incomplete and inconsistent across countries and this has 
frustrated past attempts to construct complete matrices of international movements.  Important 
progress is being made by Parsons, Skeldon, Walmsley and Winters (2005), who present 
migrant stocks for 226 countries of both origin and destination.  They rely primarily on census 
data, so that countries of origin are determined for the foreign born as countries of birth.  
These data are complemented by those on nationality, which is treated analogously to 
citizenship.  The use of the UN definition of a migrant
4 for collated data means that only 
permanent movements of natural persons are considered in their analysis. 
 
Migration Statistics 
  In addition to the national census, Parsons et al. also rely on associated labour force 
surveys, which typically include questions about the nationality and place of birth of the 
respondents.  The measurement of migrant populations based on census information 
facilitates greater comparability of statistics across countries because of the limited scope of 
the questions asked.  Drawbacks are that censuses are infrequently conducted, with “rounds” 
that usually span a decade, and each country carries out its survey at different times.  Also 
there is a tendency to under-represent migrants who may not be registered for census 
purposes. 
                                                 
4 UN (1998) definition of a migrant is “any person who changes his or her country of usual residence”.   4
  Parsons et al. (2005) also use data from population registers, which are accounts of the 
domestic and foreign population within a country.  They are generally maintained via a legal 
obligation for all persons to register themselves with the appropriate local authorities.  
Registers provide information more frequently than censuses but since not all departures are 
recorded outflow data is less reliable and there are differences in the type of migrants counted 
which must be taken into account when directly comparing data from different countries.  In 
general, immigrant stock statistics contain a high degree of cross-country heterogeneity from 
unavoidable inaccuracies associated with both individual countries’ practices for gathering 




The Migration Stock Matrix 
  We begin by constructing an accessible aggregation of the world into just 14 regions 
(Appendix 1).  The first step in generating annual migration flows between these 14 regions is 
to develop a 14 by 14 matrix of migrant stocks.  For this we rely on Parsons et al. (2005).  
Because the “continental” aggregation that has been made available from their study differs 
from ours a weighting system proved necessary.  Weights were derived by firstly calculating 
the total migrant stock in each of the 14 regions as well as in the Parsons et al. continents, 
using UN migration stock data for the year 2000 (UN, 2002).  The regional proportion of 
migrants in the continent then emerges by dividing by the migrant stock in each continent.  
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where Stockd is the migrant stock in d obtained from UN data, Stockc(d)c(r) is the migrant stock 
from continent c that contains region r to the continent that contains region d and the 
denominator is the sum of migrants from all origins in the considered continent. 
 
The Migration Flow Matrix 
  Annual flows of migrants to Australia, North America and Western Europe from the 
14 regions were obtained from Chan and Tyers (2004) with some adjustments to the 
Australian data based on Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2001).  These 
regions maintain and publish comparatively complete and accurate immigration records.  We 
                                                 
5 For example, developed countries generally include refugees in their censuses while their less developed 
counterparts do not.   5
therefore used them to investigate the relationship between flow and stock data.  The ratio of 
migrant flows to stocks was first calculated, as shown in Table 1, from which it can be seen 
that the ratios vary significantly across the destinations for each source region.  As flow data 
for the remaining 11 regions is not readily or reliably available the average ratios for each 
region of origin were applied to the stock matrix to produce the resulting matrix of migration 
flows, presented in Table 2. 
  The largest source of global migration is the region “Central Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union” whose emigrants prefer to settle in Western Europe.  The next largest source of 
immigrants is the “Rest of the World” grouping, whose emigrants tend to settle in North 
America and Western Europe.  The Central Europe and Former Soviet Union bloc is also the 
third most popular destination for migrants, following Western Europe and North America 
respectively, with 22 per cent of the Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union immigrant 
intake coming from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
  Australia has the largest volume of immigrants by comparison with its population.  
The majority of these appear to come from the “Rest of the World” bloc, which includes New 
Zealand, though Western Europeans account for 20 per cent of Australian annual immigration 
with Chinese and Other East Asians each providing roughly 10 per cent.  On the other hand, 
59 per cent of Australian emigration flows are to North America and Western Europe, 
approximately 13 per cent of Australian migrants go to Central Europe and the Former Soviet 
Union while Asia attracts 8 per cent of the Australian migrants with the largest flows being to 
India and Other South Asia.  Indonesia is the least attractive destination region for Australians 
with only 60 people migrating there annually. 
  Regions with net annual immigration, as shown in Figure 1, are Western Europe, 
North America, Australia, Middle East and North Africa, and Japan, in descending order of 
volumes.  All the remaining regions have net annual emigration rates with the Rest of the 
World providing the largest source of migrants and Indonesia the least. 
 
Migration Flows by Age and Gender 
  Detailed accounts of both the regional and the age-gender compositions of immigrant 
flows are unavailable for most countries and regions.  A comprehensive breakdown is 
available for the United States, however, via the US Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS, 2001)
6.  It is therefore assumed that the age-gender composition of all migrant flows 
matches that of immigrants to the United States.  By firstly summing the total immigrant 
                                                 
6 Thanks are due to Prof. Tim Hatton of the Australian National University for directing the author to these data.   6
population of each group for the years 1986 to 2001, the migrant population share of each 
group was derived.  These shares were then applied to the aggregate flow matrix of Table 2 to 
derive a set of eight matrices that detail the migrant flows between regions for each age-
gender group.  Thus the annual migration flow rate for age group a, gender g, from the region 
































agrd M  is the annual migration flow rate between r and d expressed as a proportion of 
the region d’s group population,  ,, agd N .  The variable  , rd M  represents the total flow of 
migrants from r to d in Table 2 and  ,, agd N t h A m e r i c a M =  is the age and gender specific flow of 
immigrants to North America. 
 
3. The Incentive to Migrate - Regional Real Wage Differences 
  Regional wage inequality stems from differences in labour productivity associated 
with different relative factor abundance and technology, combined with trade and migration 
restrictions (Tokarik, 2002; Kar and Beladi, 2002).  Trade liberalisation, along with the 
associated competition from lower-waged countries, has reduced demand for unskilled labour 
in developed countries while simultaneously increasing demand for skilled workers.  This has 
tended to drive a greater wedge between the wage rates of skilled and unskilled workforces.  
Conversely, Kar and Beladi (2002) have noted that empirical evidence suggests a narrowing 
of the wage gap between the two skill levels in developing regions.  Wage inequality can also 
be related to international migration.  Most migration, as indicated in the previous section, is 
from less developed regions to the OECD countries.  These migrants possess varying levels of 
human capital which affect the wage and employment patterns of both the source and 
destination region by changing the distribution of labour and (human) capital. 
 
Skilled and Unskilled Labour Payments 
  The key resource for this analysis is the GTAP global database.  In it, skills are 
defined based ILO occupational categories (Liu et al. 1998).  Labour is split into two levels:   7
unskilled (production) labour and skilled (professional) labour.  Skilled labour therefore 
incorporates occupations
7 requiring advanced training beyond secondary education. 
 
Market Exchange Rate Wages 
  Calculation of skilled and unskilled wages per worker firstly requires data for the total 
full time equivalent labour force over age, gender and skill level in each region.  Labour force 
numbers by age and gender were obtained from Chan and Tyers (2004) for the year 1997.  
Labour force shares of skilled workers were then obtained from Liu et al. for each GTAP-
defined region, and then aggregated to the 14 applied here. 
  The GTAP database does not offer volume statistics for primary factor inputs.  It does, 
however, provide total payments to each of the two types of labour, denominated in US 
dollars at market exchange rates (MER).  Wage rates in region r for skill level s, used for the 
purpose of this analysis were firms’ purchases at agents’ prices, EVFAs,r, which had been 
calculated as expenditure on labour by firms across all sectors.  Thus the 1997 US$ annual 
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where for age a and gender g  r g a L , ,  is the size of the full time equivalent labour force and 
,, agr S  is the volume share of skilled labour.  The resulting rates are listed in Table 3 and 
plotted in Figure 2. 
  These results indicate that the US$ rewards to workers in 1997 were highest in the 
industrialised regions while developing regions, typically with higher population densities, 
have lower wages for both skilled and unskilled workers.  There are also significant wage 
differences between the skill levels for all regions with skilled workers earning consistently 
more than their unskilled counterparts
8.  The lowest wage rate for the unskilled was in the 
Indian and Other South Asian regions with workers earning roughly US$350 per year, while 
Japan offered its unskilled labour the largest unskilled reward at a rate of US$32449 per year.  
North America and Japan payed skilled workers the highest wage at more than US$43000 per 
                                                 
7 “Skilled” occupations include managers, professionals, engineers, scientists and bureaucrats, to list a few 
(Hertel, 1997).  Unskilled workers are defined to include as tradespersons, teachers, clerks, sales assistants, 
industrial workers and farm hands (Liu et al, 1998). 
8 This is with the exception of Central Europe and the Former Soviet Union which appears to have had slightly 
larger returns to unskilled labour.  This is very likely a statistical aberration due to inaccurate national accounts 
data on labour payments.   8
year whereas India offered its skilled workers the lowest skilled compensation at an average 
wage of approximately US$650 per year. 
  The implicit assumption behind the assembly of the GTAP global database is that the 
purchasing power of one US$ is equal in all regions.  For most applications departures from 
this assumption do little harm.  In considering migration inducement, however, the fact that 
the prices of non-tradables in developing countries are lower than in industrial countries 
implies that the purchasing power of a US$ is higher in the developing countries.  Since 
inducement to migrate depends at least in part on the real purchasing power of wages in 
destination and origin regions, errors in MER-based projections of real wages tend to 
overestimate the migration response.  Purchasing power parity (PPP) derived wages would 
more reliably reflect the true distribution because they would incorporate, at least partly, a 
more realistic valuation of non-traded goods and services. 
 
Purchasing Power Parity Wages 
In order to compare the real purchasing power of wages across regions, the market 
exchange rate results in Table 3 were converted into approximate purchasing power parity 
results using a multiplier derived the Global Development Network Database (World Bank, 
2001).  This multiplier is the ratio of the MER-based GDP estimate in US$ to the 
corresponding PPP estimate, by country in 1997
9.  This was used to calculate the PPP 
multiplier for that year, 
PM
r α , on the 14 defined regions, by aggregating individual countries 
according to MER-based GDP shares.  The PPP wage estimates are therefore: 
(4)  ,,
PPP MER PM




















i GDP  and 
MER
i GDP  represent, respectively, the GDP corresponding to purchasing 
power parity and market exchange rate values in country i. 
PPP wage results are also shown in Figure 2 and Table 3.  They indicate a smaller 
wage range across regions for both skilled and unskilled workers when compared with MER 
values.  The coefficient of variation for unskilled wages per worker decreased from the MER 
ratio of 1.32 to 0.97 when using PPP.  Similarly, the PPP skilled wage rate also had a reduced 
coefficient of variation, down from the MER value of 1.11 to 0.80.  Average regional wages 
increased by approximately US$619.93 for unskilled workers and US$3,478.83 for skilled 
                                                 
9 Thanks are due to Prof. Steve Dowrick of the Australian National University for directing the authors to these 
data.   9
workers.  In developing regions, average wages rose for unskilled workers from US$1,845.8 
to US$3,984.2 and skilled workers from US$5274.3 to US$12913.7 per annum. 
 Consistent  with  MER-based wages, PPP measures exhibit higher wages in the more 
highly developed regions.  The single exception is the PPP skilled wage in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, which appears to surpass even that of Japan.  Generally, PPP wage rates in all 
developing regions are higher while those of Australia, Japan and Western Europe are lower.  
On the other hand North America, largely a developed region, has higher PPP wages.  One 
plausible explanation for this apparent anomaly is the inclusion of Mexico in the region, 
which accounts for approximately 9% of the North American PPP multiplier
10 and itself has a 
PPP to MER GDP ratio of 1.95.  India has the largest PPP multiplier with a value of 3.81, 
followed by China which has a PPP multiplier of 3.71.  Sub-Saharan Africa, with a multiplier 
of 2.85, follows Indonesia and Other South Asia which have PPP multipliers of in the vicinity 
of 3.0. 
 
4. Modelling Global Economic and Demographic Change 
  The approach adopted follows Tyers et al. (2005), in that it applies a complete 
demographic sub-model that is integrated within a dynamic numerical model of the global 
economy.
11  The economic model is a development of GTAP-Dynamic, the standard version 
of which has single households in each region and therefore no demographic structure.
12  The 




The demographic sub-model tracks populations in four age groups and two genders: a 
total of 8 population groups in each of 14 regions.
13  The four age groups are the dependent 
young, adults of fertile and working age, older working adults and the mostly-retired over 
60s.  The resulting age-gender structure is displayed in Figure 3.  The population is further 
divided between households that provide production labour and those providing professional 
                                                 
10 Canada has a GDP
PPP to GDP
MER ratio of 1.2 and accounts for 8% of the North American PPP multiplier.  The 
United States has a GDP
PPP to GDP
MER ratio of approximately 1, as can be expected since all data is listed of US 
currency, and accounts for 83% of the PPP multiplier. 
11 See also Shi and Tyers (2004) and Tyers et al. (2005). 
12 The GTAP-Dynamic model is a development of its comparative static progenitor, GTAP (Hertel et al. 1997).  
Its dynamics is described by Ianchovichina and McDougall (2000).  Earlier applications of the standard model to 
the issues raised in this paper include those by Shi and Tyers (2004) and Duncan, Shi and Tyers (2005). 
13 The demographic sub-model has been used in stand alone mode for the analysis of trends in dependency 
ratios.  For a more complete documentation of the sub-model, see Chan and Tyers (2006).   10
labour.
14  Each age-gender-skill group is a homogeneous sub-population with group-specific 
birth and death rates and rates of both immigration and emigration.
15  If the group spans T 
years, the survival rate to the next age group is the fraction 1/T of its population, after group-
specific deaths have been removed and its population has been adjusted for net migration. 
The final age group (60+) has duration equal to measured life expectancy at 60, which 
varies across genders and regions.  The key demographic parameters, then, are birth rates, sex 
ratios at birth, age and gender specific death, immigration and emigration rates and life 
expectancies at 60.
16  Immigration rates are a particular focus here and these are responsive to 
inter-regional real wage comparisons, constrained in a manner designed to represent the 
impacts of immigration policy.  A further key parameter is the rate at which each region’s 
education and social development structure transforms production worker families into 
professional worker families.  Each year a particular proportion of the population in each 
production worker age-gender group is transferred to professional status.  These proportions 
have an exogenous component that is set depending on the regions’ levels of development, the 
associated capacities of their education systems and the relative sizes of the production and 
professional labour groups.  They are also responsive to regional skilled wage premia, to an 
extent that is readily adjusted to reflect changes in the capacities of education and training 
systems. 
  In any year, for each age group, a, gender group g, skill group s, region of origin, r 
and region of destination, d, the volume of migration flow is: 
(5)  ,,,, ,,,, ,,,,, , ,
tt R t
agsrd d agsrd agsd M MN a g r d δ =∀  , 
where 
t
d δ  is a destination-specific factor reflecting immigration policy in region d, set to unity 
in all but counterfactual experiments, 
R
agsrd M is the migration rate between r and d expressed 
as a proportion of the group population in region d,  agsd N .  The migration rate is then 
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14 The subdivision between production and professional labour accords with the ILO’s occupation-based 
classification and is consistent with the labour division adopted in the GTAP Database.  See Liu et al. (1998). 
15 Mothers in families providing production labour are assumed to produce children that will grow up to also 
provide production labour, while the children of mothers in professional families are correspondingly assumed to 
become professional workers. 
16 Immigration and emigration are also age and gender specific.  The model represents a full matrix of global 
migration flows for each age and gender group.  Each of these flows is currently set at a constant proportion of 
the population of its destination group.  See Chan and Tyers (2006) and Vedi (2005) for further details.   11
where  , s r W  and  , s d W  are wage rates by skill level in regions of origin and destination 
(measured relative to a common global numeraire), 
C
r P  and 
C
d P  are consumer price levels in 
the two regions (measured relative to the same global numeraire) and  ,,,,
M
agsrd ε  is an elasticity 
of response that reflects the extent to which immigration policies constrain the bilateral flow 
between r and d. 
  Given the migration matrix, agsrd M , the population in each age, gender and skill group 
and region can be constructed.  We begin with the population of males aged 0-14 from 
professional families in region d (a=014, g=m, s=sk, r=d). 
(7) 
11
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d S  is the sex ratio at birth (the ratio of male to female births) in region d,  ,
t
s d B  is the 
birth rate for women of skill level sk,  014, ,
t
md D the death rate and  d ρ  is the rate at which region 
d’s educational institutions and general development transform production into professional 
worker families.  The final term is survival to the corresponding 15-39 age group.  In the 
corresponding equation for young males from production worker families the penultimate 
term is negative and the subscript sk is replaced with unsk in all but that penultimate term. 
For females in professional families in this age group the corresponding equation is: 
(8) 
11
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1
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For adults of gender g from professional families in the age group 15-39 the equation includes 
a survival term from the younger age group.  It is: 
(9) 
11 1
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where the second term is the surviving inflow from the 0-14 age group and the final term is 
the surviving outflow to the 40-59 age group.  Again, the skill transformation term is negative   12
in the case of the corresponding equation for production worker families.  The population of 
professional adults of gender g, in age group 40-59 follows as: 
(10) 
11 1
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For adults in the 60+ age group, the corresponding relationship is: 
(11) 
11 1
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where the final term indicates that deaths from this group each year depend on its life 
expectancy at 60,  60 , , ,
t
g sk d L + .  Again, the equation for aged production worker family members 
is the same except that the skill transformation term is negative. 
 Finally,  d ρ , the rate at which region d’s educational institutions and general 
development transform production into professional worker families depends on the level of 


































d ε  is the elasticity of the transformation rate to the skilled to unskilled wage ratio.  This 
elasticity is thought to be larger the more developed the region.  To represent this, it is set to 
grow with real per capita GNP according to elasticity
TY
d ε . 
 
Sources and structure: 
  Key parameters in the model are the migration rates,  ,,,,
R
agsrd M , birth rates,  ,
t
s r B , sex 
ratios at birth, 
t
r S , death rates,  ,,,
t
agsr D , life expectancies at 60,  60 , , ,
t
g sr L +  and the skill 
transformation rates  d ρ .  The migration rates are based on the flows analysed in Section 2.  
In the base line projection they are held constant through time – the elasticity  ,,,,
M
agsrd ε  is made 
negligibly small.  The skill transformation rates are based on changes during the decade prior 
to the base year, 1997, in the composition of aggregate regional labour forces as between   13
production and professional workers.  In the base line projection these are also held constant 
through time – the elasticities 
TW
d ε  and 
TY
d ε  are made negligibly small.
17 
 
Asymptotic trends in other parameters: 
  The birth rates, life expectancy at 60 and the age specific mortality rates all trend 
through time asymptotically.  For each age group, a, gender group, g, and region, r, a target 
rate is identified.
18  The parameters then approach these target rates with initial growth rates 
determined by historical observation.  In year t the birth rate of region r is: 
(13)  () ( )
000 1
tt
rr T g t r B BBB e
β =+ − −  , 
where the rate of approach, β, is calibrated from the historical growth rate: 



























Labour force projections: 
To evaluate the number of “full-time equivalent” workers we first construct labour 
force participation rates, Pa,g,r by gender and age group for each region from ILO statistics on 
the “economically active population”.  We then investigate the proportion of workers that are 
part time and the hours they work relative to each regional standard for full time work.  The 
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Here  ,
t
ar µ  is a shift parameter reflecting the influence of policy on participation rates.  The 
time superscript on  ,,
t
agr P  refers to the extrapolation of observed trends in these parameters.
19 
 
Asymptotic trends in labour force participation: 
                                                 
17 Note that, as regions become more advanced and populations in the production worker families become 
comparatively small, the skill transformation rate has a diminishing effect on the professional population. 
18 In this discussion the skill index, s, is omitted because birth and death rates, and life expectancies at 60 do not 
vary by skill category in the version of the model used. 
19 Although part time hours may well also be trending through time, we hold F constant in the current version of 
the model.   14
For each age group, a, gender group, g, and region, r, a target country is identified 
whose participation rate is approached asymptotically.  The rate of this approach is 
determined by the initial rate of change.  Thus, the participation rate takes the form: 
(17)  ( )( )
00 0
,, ,, ,, 1
tt
agr agr T g t agr PP P P e
β =+ − −  , 
where the rate of approach, β, is calibrated from the initial participation growth rate: 
(18)  () ( )
00 10
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Target rates are chosen from countries considered “advanced” in terms of trends in 
participation rates.  Where female participation rates are rising, therefore, Norway provides a 




Accounting for part time work: 
  For each age group, a, gender, g, and region, r, full-time equivalency depends on the 
fraction of participants working full time, fa,g,r, and, for those working part time, the ratio of 
average part time hours to full time hours for that gender group and region, rg,r.  For each 
group, the ratio of full time equivalent workers to total labour force participants is then 
(20)  ( ) ,, ,, ,, , 1 agr agr agr gr Ff f r =+ − .
21 
 
The aged dependency ratio: 
We define and calculate four dependency ratios: 1) a youth dependency ratio is the 
number of children per full time equivalent worker, 2) an aged dependency ratio is the 
number of persons over 60 per full time equivalent worker, 3) a non-working aged 
dependency ratio is the number of non-working persons over 60 per full time equivalent 
worker, and 4) a more general dependency ratio is defined that takes as its numerator the total 
non-working population, including children.
22  That of used here is the one of most 
widespread policy interest, the non-working aged dependency ratio: 
                                                 
20 The resulting participation rates are listed by Chan and Tyers (2005: Table 10). 
21 Preliminary estimates of fa,g,r and rg,r are approximated from OECD (1999: Table 1.A.4) and OECD (2002: 
Statistical Annex, Table F).  No data has yet been sought on part time work in non-OECD member countries.  In 
these cases the diversity of OECD estimates is used to draw parallels between countries and regions and thus to 
make educated guesses.  The results are listed by Chan and Tyers (2006: Tables 11 and 12).   
22 All these dependency ratios are defined in detail by Chan and Tyers (2006).   15
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4.2 The Global Economic Model 
GTAP-Dynamic is a multi-region, multi-product dynamic simulation model of the world 
economy.  It is a microeconomic model, in that assets and money are not represented and 
prices are set relative to a global numeraire.  In the version used, the world is subdivided into 
14 regions.  Industries are aggregated into just three sectors, food (including processed foods), 
industry (mining and manufacturing) and services.  To reflect composition differences 
between regions, these products are differentiated by region of origin, meaning that the “food” 
produced in one region is not the same as that produced in others.  Consumers substitute 
imperfectly between foods from different regions. 
As in most other dynamic models of the global economy, in GTAP-Dynamic the 
endogenous component of simulated economic growth is physical capital accumulation.  
Technical change is introduced in the form of exogenous trends and skill (or human capital) 
acquisition is driven by the constant transformation rates introduced in the previous section.  
A consequence of this is that the model exhibits the property of all dynamic models of the 
Solow-Swan type that incorporate diminishing returns to factor use, namely that an increase 
in the growth rate of the population raises the growth rate of real GDP but reduces the level of 
real per capita income.  What distinguishes the model from this simpler progenitor is its 
recursive multi-regional dynamics.  Investors have adaptive expectations about the real net 
rates of return on installed capital in each region.  These drive the distribution of investment 
across regions.  In each, the level of investment is determined by a comparison of net rates of 
return with borrowing rates yielded by a global trust to which each region’s saving 
contributes. 
To capture the full effects of demographic change, including those of ageing, the standard 
model has been modified to include multiple age, gender and skill groups in line with the 
structure of the demographic sub-model.  In the complete model, these 16 groups differ in 
their consumption preferences, saving rates and their labour supply behaviour.  Unlike the 
standard GTAP models, in which regional incomes are split between private consumption, 
government consumption and total saving via an upper level Cobb-Douglas utility function 
that implies fixed regional saving rates, this adaptation first divides regional incomes between 
government consumption and total private disposable income.  The implicit assumption is that 
governments balance their budgets while private groups save or borrow.   16
In splitting each region’s private disposable income between the eight age-gender groups, 
the approach is to construct a weighted subdivision that draws on empirical studies of the 
distribution of disposable income between age-gender groups for “typical” advanced and 
developing countries.
23  Individuals in each age-gender group then split their disposable 
incomes between consumption and saving.  For this a reduced form approach is taken to the 
intertemporal optimisation problem faced by each.  It employs an exponential consumption 
equation that links group real per capita consumption expenditure to real per capita disposable 
income and the real interest rate.  This equation is calibrated for each group and region based 
on a set of initial (1997) age-specific saving rates from per capita disposable income.
24  
Importantly, these show transitions to negative saving with retirement in the older industrial 
regions.  This gives rise to declines in average saving rates as population’s age.  The empirical 
studies on age-specific saving behaviour are less clear, however, when it comes to developing 
regions.  In the important case of China, for example, only modest declines in saving rates are 
recorded when people retire.  This is partly due to the complication that a comparatively large 
proportion of consumption spending by the Chinese elderly, and those in other developing 
regions, is financed from the income of younger family members. 
 
5. Constructing the Base Line Scenario 
The base line scenario represents a “business as usual” projection of the global economy 
through 2030.  Although policy analysis can be sensitive to the content of this scenario, the 
focus of this paper is on the extent of departures from it that would be caused by alternative 
levels of responsiveness of migration flows to inter-regional real wage divergences.  
Nonetheless, it is instructive to describe the base line, because all scenarios examined have in 
common a set of assumptions about future trends in productivity and because some exposition 
of the base line makes the construction of departures from it clearer. 
 
Exogenous factor productivity growth 
Exogenous sources of growth enter the model as factor productivity growth shocks, 
applied separately for each of the model’s five factors of production (land, physical capital, 
natural resources, production labour and professional labour).  Simulated growth rates are 
very sensitive to productivity growth rates since, the larger these are for a particular region the 
larger is that region’s marginal product of capital.  The region therefore enjoys higher levels 
of investment and hence a double boost to its per capita real income growth rate.  The 
                                                 
23 The analytics of income splitting are described in detail by Tyers et al. (2005). 
24 For further details, see Tyers et al. (2005).   17
importance of productivity notwithstanding, the empirical literature is inconsistent as to 
whether productivity growth has been faster in agriculture or in manufacturing and whether 
the gains in any sector have enhanced all primary factors or merely production labour.  The 
factor productivity growth rates assumed in all scenarios are drawn from a new survey of the 
relevant empirical literature (Tyers et al. 2005).  Agricultural productivity grows more rapidly 
than that in the other sectors in China, along with Australia, Indonesia, Other East Asia, India 
and Other South Asia.  This allows continued shedding of labour to the other sectors.  In the 
other industrialised regions, the process of labour relocation has slowed down and labour 
productivity growth is slower in agriculture.  In the other developing regions, the relocation of 
workers from agriculture has tended not to be so rapid. 
 
Interest premia 
The standard GTAP-Dynamic model takes no explicit account of financial market maturity 
or investment risk and so tends to allocate investment to regions that have high marginal 
products of physical capital.  These tend to be labour-abundant developing countries whose 
labour forces are still expanding rapidly.  Although the raw model finds these regions 
attractive prospects for this reason, we know that considerations of financial market 
segmentation, financial depth and risk limit the flow of foreign investment at present and that 
these are likely to remain important in the future.  To account for this we have constructed a 
“pre-base line” simulation in which we maintain the relative growth rates of investment across 
regions.  In this simulation, global investment rises and falls but its allocation between regions 
is thus controlled. 
To do this the interest premium variable (GTAP Dynamic variable SDRORT) is made 
endogenous.  This creates wedges between the international and regional borrowing rates.  
They show high interest premia for the populous developing regions of Indonesia, India, 
South America and Sub-Saharan Africa.  Premia tend to fall over time in other regions, where 
labour forces are falling or growing more slowly.  Most spectacular is a secular fall in the 
Chinese premium.  This is because the pre-base simulation maintains investment growth in 
China despite an eventual decline in its labour force.  This simulation is therefore overly 
optimistic with respect to China and so we reject the drastic declines in the investment 
premium that it implies.  In constructing the final base line scenario, we allow a fall in 
China’s premium by 1.5 percentage points.
25  The time paths of all interest premia are set as 
                                                 
25 See Tyers and Golley (2006) for further details on the treatment of China.   18
exogenous and regional investment is freed up in all regions.  Investment is then retained as 
endogenous in the model’s closure in all subsequent simulations. 
 
The base line projection 
Demographic changes in the base line projection are characterised by declining fertility 
and ageing everywhere.  The key demographic differences between regions concern their 
initial age distributions – the industrialised regions begin with older populations than the 
developing ones and so, generally, population growth continues to be higher in the developing 
regions, and particularly in South Asia and Africa, as shown in Figure 4.  The pervasive 
ageing is suggested by the projected sizes and composition of regional labour forces in Table 
4 and the non-working aged dependency ratios in Table 5.  The corresponding base line 
projection for the global economy is suggested by Table 6, which details the average GDP 
and real per capita income growth performance of each region from 1997 to 2030.  In part 
because of its comparatively young population and hence its continuing rapid labour force 
growth, India attracts substantial new investment and is projected to take over from China as 
the world’s most rapidly expanding region.  Rapid population growth detracts from India’s 
real per capita income performance, however.  By this criterion, China is the strongest 
performing region through the three decades.  Indonesia and “other East Asia” are also strong 
performers, while the older industrial economies continue to grow more slowly.  The African 
regions enjoy good GDP growth performance but their high population growth rates limit 
their performance in per capita terms. 
 
6. Increasing Responsiveness to Real Wage Divergences 
  The shocks introduced centre on the elasticities in equations (6) and (12).  Recall from 
(6) that  ,,,,
M
agsrd ε  is the elasticity of the migration rate for skill level s between regions r and d 
to the ratio of the destination and origin real wages.  In the base line simulation, this elasticity 
is set to negligibility, so that migration flows are driven only by the sizes of destination 
populations in each age-gender group.  That is, flows maintain base period rates of migration 
over destination populations in each bilateral direction for each age-gender group.  The first 
alternative simulation, labelled M1, simply expands this elasticity, for skilled workers only, to 
a value of 0.5 in the interval 2000-2010.  Skilled migration flows then increase by most 
between low and high real wage regions.  Because this additional migration makes skilled 
workers scarcer in the regions of origin, however, the skill premium rises in those regions.    19
This might be expected to induce a skill-acquisition response from production workers in the 
regions of origin. 
Allowance for accelerated skill transformation takes the form of (12), in which 
TW
d ε is 
the elasticity of the transformation rate to ratio of skilled and production real wages and 
TY
d ε  
governs the response of 
TW
d ε to rising real per capita incomes and hence rising educational 
opportunity.  A second alternative simulation is constructed that is the same as M1 except that 
accelerated skill transformation is allowed by adjusting these elasticities.  More particularly, 
the new simulation, labelled M2, has 
TY
d ε  rising to a value of 0.218.
26  Since 
TW
d ε is set at 
negligibility in the base line, so that skill transformation rates are constant for each region, its 
enlargement enables responses to pre-existing skill premia.  Where these are large, as is most 
notably the case in Sub-Saharan Africa (Figure 2), skill acquisition can therefore be expected 
to accelerate most.  The values attained for the transformation rates are listed in Table 7. 
  Expanding migration in a manner that is responsive to real wage differences is found, 
not surprisingly, to yield “more of the same” in terms of the direction of migration flows.  
This is clear from comparing the patterns of base period annual flows, indicated in Figure 1, 
with the accumulated flows over the next three decades shown in Figure 5.  Except in the 
cases of two prominent regions of origin, Central Europe and the former Soviet Union and the 
“rest of the world” group, migrants tend to leave populous regions, so that their departures 
have little effect on most populations of regions of origin.  They do make a significant 
difference in the principal regions of destination, however, Western Europe, North America 
and Australia, as shown in Figure 6.
27  Of the regions identified, the skilled migrant intake is 
largest relative to the destination population in Australia, where the additional migrants 
expand the 2030 population by almost a tenth. 
  The economic effects of these migrant flows come from changes in skilled labour 
forces and, because the migrants tend to be younger than the average age in destination 
regions, changes in non-working aged dependency ratios.  The labour force effects are 
suggested by Figure 7 and detailed in Table 8.  The skilled labour forces of Western Europe, 
North America and Australia are raised by between a tenth and a quarter, while those of the 
key regions of origin fall.  The corresponding effects on aged dependency are smaller, 
however.  Considering the large three-decade increases in the base line (Table 5), the 2030 
non-working aged dependency ratios of the principal destination regions fall only by a 
                                                 
26 Higher values cause the skill premia in some regions to collapse. 
27 The Middle East and North Africa is also a prominent destination region, particularly for workers from South 
and Southeast Asia, but this migration remains small in relation to the population of that region.   20
fraction of a per cent in Western Europe, a percent or so in North America and nearly two per 
cent in Australia (Table 9).  Clearly, the age distribution effects are modest and expanded 
migration is unlikely to be a solution to the fiscal problems associated with ageing.
28 
  The expanded skilled labour forces in the principal destination regions do have 
economic implications, however.  Although their effects on the average growth rates of GDP 
over three decades are small compared with the drivers of base line growth (Figure 8), the 
overall economies of the destination regions are larger than their base line levels by between 
two and eight per cent (Figure 9).  When the additional effect of skill acquisition is added, in 
M2, there are further boosts to GDP in the destination regions (Figure 10).  This time, 
however, the change in skill composition in some regions of origin outweighs the effect of 
emigration and so also raises their GDP levels.  For the world as a whole, the migrations raise 
2030 global GDP by 1.6 per cent.  The assumed homogeneity of professional workers across 
regions and the market exchange rate database of the GTAP-Dynamic model, which tends to 
make labour productivity in tradeable goods sectors more similar than the actual wage data of 
Section 3 suggest, both act to reduce the estimated global GDP gains from the relocation of 
skilled workers. 
  The impacts of increased migration on labour markets are shown in Figure 11.  They 
are straight-forward.  In M1, where there is no change in the rate of skill acquisition within 
regions, real skilled wages fall in destination regions, which experience increased skilled 
labour supply, and rise in regions of origin.  Production wages rise in the destination regions, 
since the rise in the supply of skill raises the marginal product of production labour there.  
The opposite is true in regions of origin, where the skill supply falls.  It is also evident from 
Figure 11 that the skill premium falls in the destination regions and rises in the regions of 
origin.  Even though the labour forces of India and “other South Asia” are very large by 
comparison with their emigrations, their skilled labour forces are reduced by measurable 
proportions (Figure 7).  This causes the significant increases in their skilled wage rates 
relative to the base line projection, shown in Figure 11 and listed in Table 10.  The 
corresponding changes in East and Southeast Asia are smaller because skilled wages are 
higher there at the outset and so proportionally smaller emigrations are induced.
29 
It is the widening of skill premia in the regions of origin that suggest the possibility 
that higher rates of skill acquisition might be induced in these regions.  When these are 
allowed for, in M2, the general pattern of wage changes in the destination regions is not 
                                                 
28 This is a well-established conclusion in demography that has been re-examined following the rise in concern 
about ageing and slower growth in Europe.  See, for example, Young (1990) and United Nations (2000a). 
29 The pattern for the “Middle East and North Africa” is reversed, of course, because this region is a destination 
for migrants due to its concentrations of petroleum wealth, even though it includes many poor countries.   21
greatly different.  Their skill premia contract by more because additional skill acquisition is 
stimulated through its increased sensitivity to their existing skill premia.  This is most 
pronounced in North America, where the skill premium is larger at the outset than it is either 
in Western Europe or Australia (Figure 2). 
  In the regions of origin the rates of skill acquisition expand more markedly.  Not only 
is this due to the loss of skilled workers abroad and the resultant widening of their skill 
premia, but, as Figure 11 also shows, the most pronounced effects are in the poorest regions, 
where the base period skill premia were extremely high (Figure 2).  For this reason, the wage 
of skilled workers falls by most in the Middle East and North Africa and in Sub-Saharan 
Africa.  It falls by more modest yet significant proportions in South America and in East and 
Southeast Asia, where this constitutes a reversal of the effects of pure skilled migration (M1).  
That reversal is due to the dominance over skilled wage determination by the domestic skill 
transformation process, with its enhanced sensitivity to high domestic skill premia, rather than 
by emigration. 
  Returning to the declines in skill premia in the principal destination regions, the extent 
of this is, understandably, quite sensitive to the real wage divergence elasticity,  ,,,,
M
agsrd ε .  To 
minimise arbitrariness, we have shocked this elasticity to the same level (0.5) on all bilateral 
migration links.  Too large an increase in this elasticity (say to a value of unity) causes the 
collapse of skill premia, first in Australia, where the proportional effects of the migrations are 
largest.  The scale of the wage convergence embodied in the results shown in Figure 11 is 
further elucidated in Figures 12 through 14.  In Australia, the skill premium is reduced in 
proportion, though not in level, while in North America and Western Europe, it is merely 
stabilised in proportion.  Convergence of wage rates between regions, however, remains very 
modest, even with this substantial increase in skill migration flows (Table 10).  All this 
suggests that global labour markets offer scope for still further expansions in skilled 
migration. 
  Finally, the net effects of all this on real per capita income are indicated in Table 11.  
They are surprisingly small, each a fraction of a per cent of 2030 real per capita income.  The 
migration-only effects, from M1, are two-fold.  First, immigration raises the domestic 
population, always decreasing real income per capita in this neoclassical framework.
30  
Second, the skill-composition of the labour force is increased by the immigration, which tends 
                                                 
30 This result is common to all models where the growth rate depends on the rate of physical capital 
accumulation and where there are diminishing returns to capital and labour, the simplest of these models being 
that of Solow (….) and Swan (….).  While our model has exogenous technical change it occurs at constant rates, 
which are independent of capital accumulation and common to the base line, M1 and M2 simulations.   22
to raise real income per capita and hence at least partially offset the population effect.  In 
Australia, because of the dominance of the population-expanding effect, real per capita 
income is shown to decline.  In North America and Western Europe, however, the effects on 
their total populations are smaller relative to those of their skill distributions and so the net 
effect on their per capita incomes is positive.  Moreover, in these large regions the 
immigrations affect the terms of trade.  Both are net importers of labour-intensive goods and, 
while each is large in economic terms, their labour forces are substantially smaller than those 
of the sum of their trading partners.  This means that, drawing labour from their trading 
partners causes proportional increases in their labour forces that are larger than the 
complementary proportional decreases in the labour forces of other regions.  The migrations 
therefore improve their terms of trade by reducing their excess demand for labour intensive 
goods to an extent that is proportionally larger than the reduction in their collective trading 
partners’ excess supplies.  Finally, when changed rates of skill-acquisition are added in M2, 
there are gains in real per capita income in all regions, relative to M1.  Again, this is because 
the proportion of workers in the higher-earning skilled category has risen.  Not surprisingly, 
these extra gains are largest in the Middle East and in Africa. 
 
7 Conclusion 
  To investigate the effects on labour markets and the distribution of growth, a new 
demographic sub-model that is integrated with an adaptation of the GTAP-Dynamic global 
economic model.  Skilled migration flows are assumed to be motivated by real wage 
differences to an extent that is variably constrained by immigration policies.  A uniform 
relaxation of these constraints on all inter-regional migration flows has most effect on labour 
markets in the traditional migration destinations, Australia, Western Europe and North 
America, where it restrains the skill premium and substantially enhances GDP growth.  The 
skill premium is raised, however, in regions of origin, and particularly in South Asia, although 
the extent of this is shown to depend sensitively on the assumed responsiveness of skill 
acquisition to regional skill premia.  In regions where skill premia are high at the outset, such 
as in North America, the Middle East and Africa, skill acquisition then has a larger effect on 
regional wages than does migration. 
  The effects of expanded skilled migration on real per capita incomes depend on its 
implications for population sizes, labour force skill shares and the international terms of trade.  
As it turns out, these different effects tend to be off-setting, so that net changes in real per 
capita incomes are proportionally small.   23
  Four important caveats must be borne in mind.  First, our base period matrices of 
migration flows leave room for improvement, since, given the paucity of standardised 
migration data, their construction depends on numerous assumptions.  New research on the 
documentation of migration stocks and flows will soon render some of those assumptions 
unnecessary.  Second, because our flow matrices are constructed from corresponding matrices 
of migrant stocks that are based originally on census data, there is no distinction between 
short- and long-stay migrants and hence no accounting for remittance payments.  Third, our 
model depends heavily on the GTAP global database, which takes incomplete account of 
inter-regional variations in the pricing of goods and services that are costly to trade.  Indeed, 
in the standard version of the model the levels of wages and of factor endowments do not 
need to be made explicit.  This means that inter-regional differences in factor productivity are 
imperfectly accounted for and PPP adjustments are needed in modelling the motive for 
migration.  We have blended the standard database with additional information about labour 
supplies and wage levels to make possible our analysis of increases in the responsiveness of 
migration flows to wage divergences.  In the long run, a more systemic solution to this 
problem is required, since solutions to this problem are required not only for applications of 
such models to migration but also to energy and environmental issues.  Finally, although there 
is evidence to support it, we do not allow the fertility of professional households to depart 
from that of production worker households.  Since a perception that skilled households have 
reduced fertility is an important aspect of the motivation for skill shortage claims in the 
industrial countries, further research on the topic should better account for variations not only 
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Figure 2:  Initial Wages per Worker in each Region by Skill Level 
$US ‘000   29
Figure 3: The Demographic Sub-Model 
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Figure 12: Australian Wage Convergence in M2 






















Figure 13: North American Wage Convergence in M2 
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Figure 14: Western European Wage Convergence in M2 



















Table 1: Ratio of Estimated Migrant Stocks to Recorded Annual 
Migration Flows in Australia, North America and Western Europe, 
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Australia  0 3.025201 8.989963 6.007582 
North America  2.644216 0 7.029465 4.836841 
Western Europe  1.818013 1.18226 0 1.500137 
Central Europe, FSU  0.478116 1.322667 4.478153 2.092979 
Japan  0.115782 0.439094 0.303218 0.286031 
China  13.56907 13.60295 5.251 10.80767 
Indonesia  23.54253 2.389023 3.093284 9.674946 
Other East Asia  9.946415 13.15915 7.982539 10.3627 
India  2.571327 4.771925 3.421751 3.588334 
Other South Asia  2.173844 4.321764 1.358993 2.6182 
South America  3.569294 2.323215 0.939522 2.277344 
Mid East Nth Africa  1.091152 0.655403 3.334289 1.693615 
Sub-Saharan Africa  4.961956 4.284872 1.760036 3.668955 
Rest of World  44.56669 52.44887 220.8577 105.9578 
Sources: -Migration Policy Institute (2004), “Global Data Center” The Migration Information Source, 
Washington. (http://www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData); 
-DIMIA (2001), “Immigration Federation to Century’s End 1901-2000”. Statistics Section, 
Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.    39
Table 2: Estimated Annual Flow of Migrants by Sending and Host Region 
 



































































































































































































Australia  0  10000  13855 5184 246 532 60 583 951 949 192 3244 3076  1638 40509 
North America  3722  0 88730 45687 2959 6407 725 7024  11453  11433 5894 40466 48162  14611 287272 
Western Europe  20326 48139  0 81888 2540 5501 623 6031 9834 9816 5143 32393 22530 1843 246606 
Central Europe, 
FSU  6000  60451 366672  0  3771  8166  924  8953 14598 14573  7635  48087  33445  2736  576012 
Japan  50 1500  800 2000  0 545 62 597 974 972  65 3076 1170 109 11921 
China  12689  100626 30000 50000 5253  0  1287  12471  20334  20298 1357 64213 24433 2278 345240 
Indonesia  2491 2000 2000 3000 515  1115  0  1223  1994  1990 133 6296 2396 223 25377 
Other East Asia  10197  106723 50000 60000 6324  13695  1550  0  24481  24438 1634 77311 29417 2742 408513 
India  4298 63103 34947 41136 3720 8056 912 8832  0  14376  961 45477 17304 1613 244735 
Other South Asia  3628 57050 13855 29962 2710 5868 664 6433  10489  0  700 33124 12604 1175 178260 
South America  2000  47169 7382 8286 308 667 75 731  1192  1190  0 4104 4157 505 77765 
Mid East Nth 
Africa  5742  26979 114410  42026  3553  7694  871  8436 13754 13730  919  0  20187  1532  259832 
Sub-Saharan Africa  9293  47669  50630 118467  4053  8776  993  9622 15688 15661  1070  61849  0  1518  345287 
Rest of World  22303  245228 93851 50539 3030 6562 743 7195  11731  11710 5238 41138 46852  0 546119 
Total  102739 816636 867130 538173 38982 73584 9489 78130  137473  141137 30941 460777 265735 32523 3593448 
Sources: -Migration Policy Institute (2004), “Global Data Center” The Migration Information Source, Washington. (http://www.migrationinformation.org/GlobalData); 
-DIMIA (2001), “Immigration Federation to Century’s End 1901-2000”. Statistics Section, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs.  
-Parsons, C., R. Skeldon, T. Walmsley and A. Winters (2005), “Quantifying the international bilateral movements of migrants”. GTAP Technical Paper No. 1776, 
Purdue University. (www.gtap-agecon.purdue.edu/resources); 
-USCIS (2001), “Yearbook of Immigration Statistics”, Office of Immigration Statistics, US Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
(www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook).   40
Table 3: Wages per Worker at Market Exchange Rates (MER) and 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP)
a 
(US$ ‘000 per year) 
 
 Unskilled  Skilled 
   MER  PPP  MER  PPP 
Australia  20.5 19.6 33.8 32.3 
North America  23.1 27.9 44.5 53.7 
Western Europe  19.5 16.7 29.5 25.3 
Central Europe, FSU  2.4 4.8 2.1 4.3 
Japan  32.4 23.3 43.3 31.1 
China  0.9 3.7 2.4 9.8 
Indonesia  0.7 2.3 1.0 3.3 
Other East Asia  2.5 7.9 5.5  17.5 
India  0.4 1.4 0.7 2.5 
Other South Asia  0.3 0.9 0.8 2.0 
South America  4.4 7.3  11.5  18.8 
Mid East Nth Africa  2.9 5.2  10.0  17.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.9 3.2  12.7  46.6 
Rest of World  3.1 3.3 6.2 6.6 
Mean  8.1 9.1  14.6  19.4 
Standard Deviation  10.8 8.9 16.1  16.6 
Coefficient of Variation  1.32 0.98 1.11 0.86 
a Wages, denominated in thousands of US dollars per worker, are values of firms’ purchases at agents’ prices. 
Sources: -GTAP Database; 
-Liu, J. et al (1998), “Disaggregating Labour Payments by Skill Level in GTAP”. GTAP Technical 
Paper No. 11, Purdue University. (www.gtap-agecon.purdue.edu/resources); 
-World Bank (2000), “Global network development database: macro time series”, World Bank 
Washington DC, (www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.html). 
 
 
Table 4: Base Line Projections of Labour Force Size and Structure 
 
  Labour force
a  % Female  % 40+ 
  Initial 2030 Initial 2030 Initial 2030 
Australia  8  10 37 40 42 48 
North America  182  250  40 42 42 47 
Western Europe  184  165  40 44 47 55 
Central Europe  181  148  47 46 44 53 
Japan  61 55 37 37 58 65 
China  570  592  37 36 34 47 
Indonesia  87  130  38 38 40 54 
Other East Asia  127  178  41 40 37 51 
India  356  594  27 28 36 47 
Other South Asia  134  265  28 28 32 44 
South America  123  193  38 39 33 48 
Mid East Nth Afr  103  176  24 23 30 42 
Sub-Saharan Afr  150  349  28 29 29 36 
Rest of World  79  131  36 34 38 48 
a  Measured in full time equivalent workers. 
Source: Projection using the demographic model described in the text, as presented in detail by Chan and Tyers 
(2005).   41
 
 
Table 5: Base Line Non-Working Aged Dependency Ratios 
 
Per cent  Non-working aged/working 
  Initial 2030 
Australia  35 55 
North America  24 37 
Western Europe  42 61 
Central Europe  29 41 
Japan  32 47 
China  19 44 
Indonesia  9 16 
Other East Asia  9 22 
India  12 23 
Other South Asia  9 17 
South America  16 28 
Mid East Nth Africa  15 33 
Sub-Saharan Africa  13 15 
Rest of World  15 27 
Source: Base period statistics constructed from population statistics from United Nations (2003) and simulation 





Table 6:  Base Line Real GDP and per Capita Income Projections to 2030 
 
% change 2030 over 1997  Implied average annual growth rate, 
%/yr 
 
Real GDP  Real per capita 
income 
Real GDP  Real per capita 
income 
Australia 262  178  4.0  3.1 
North America  253  171  3.9  3.1 
Western Europe  159  177  2.9  3.1 
Central Europe & FSU  205  210  3.4  3.5 
Japan 166  217  3.0  3.6 
China 340  400  4.6  5.0 
Indonesia 490  371  5.5  4.8 
Other East Asia  529  373  5.7  4.8 
India 565  292  5.9  4.2 
Other South Asia  430  127  5.2  2.5 
South America  293  149  4.2  2.8 
Mid East & Nth Africa  280  104  4.1  2.2 
Sub-Saharan Africa  360  114  4.7  2.3 
Rest of World  336  159  4.6  2.9 
Source: The base line projection described in the text.   42
 
 







Australia 0.12  0.17 
North America  0.30  0.52 
Western Europe  0.13  0.18 
Central Europe  0.12  0.13 
Japan 0.15  0.19 
China 0.08  0.11 
Indonesia 0.10  0.14 
Other East Asia  0.11  0.16 
India 0.08  0.09 
Other South Asia  0.07  0.09 
South America  0.10  0.16 
Mid East Nth Africa  0.08  0.19 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.04  0.09 
Rest of World  0.10  0.14 
a  The proportion, ρ, of production worker families that are transformed into professional families each year 
(equation 12). 
Source: Economy-wide skill subdivisions from the ILO Yearbook, various issues, and simulations constructed 






Table 8:  Skilled and Unskilled Labour Force, Baseline, M1 and M2 
  (Millions) 
  Baseline initial  Baseline 2030  M1 2030  M2 2030 
 Skilled  Unskilled  Skilled  Unskilled  Skilled Unskilled  Skilled  Unskilled
Australia 2.3  5.3  2.7  6.0 3.4 6.0  3.4  6.0 
North America  47.8  134.2  62.1 174.8  69.7 174.8  76.8  168.2 
Western Europe  56.5  127.4  51.2 113.2  55.9 113.2  57.1  112.1 
Central Europe  45.1  136.4  39.8 114.9  35.9 114.9  36.2  114.6 
Japan 19.3  42.0  17.8  37.4 18.1 37.4  18.5  37.1 
China 71.1  498.7  79.2  513.4 77.8 513.4  81.4  509.8 
Indonesia 9.3  78.2  13.8  114.9 13.7 114.9  14.6  114.0 
Other East Asia  19.9  107.1  28.5 145.1  27.8 145.1  29.4  143.5 
India 36.9  319.2  65.7  523.2 63.0 523.2  64.4  521.6 
Other South Asia  13.8  120.1  28.2 235.0  26.0 235.0  26.7  234.2 
South America  17.7  105.0  28.3 163.0  28.1 163.0  30.2  160.9 
Mid East Nth Afr  5.6  97.0  9.8 171.1 10.1 171.1  13.7  167.5 
Sub-Saharan Afr  3.5  146.9  7.9 336.9  7.9 336.9  10.9  333.8 
Rest of World  12.8  65.8  20.6 108.3  18.6 108.3  19.5  107.3 
Source: GTAP 5 Database, base period labour force estimates from Chan and Tyers (2006) and simulations 







Table 9: Changes in 2030 Non-Working Aged Dependency Ratios
a 
 
Percentage points  Non-working aged/working 
  M1 M2 
Australia  -1.83 -1.89 
North America  -0.29 -0.32 
Western Europe  -0.95 -0.97 
Central Europe  0.49 0.50 
Japan  -0.15 -0.15 
China  0.03 0.03 
Indonesia  0.00 0.00 
Other East Asia  0.01 0.01 
India  0.00 0.01 
Other South Asia  -0.02 -0.02 
South America  0.01 0.01 
Mid East Nth Africa  0.00 0.01 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.00 0.00 
Rest of World  -1.83 -1.89 
a  These are percentage point changes in the non-working aged dependency ratios listed in Table 5. 







      Table 10:  Skilled and Unskilled Wages, Baseline, M1 and M2 
   (US$  ‘000  per  year) 
  baseline initial  baseline 2030  M1 2030  M2 2030 
 Skilled  Unskilled  Skilled  Unskilled  Skilled Unskilled  Skilled  Unskilled
Australia  33.8 20.5  89.8  57.4  80.3  60.5  79.1  61.0 
North America  44.5 23.1 108.7  56.4  102.6  58.2  96.5  60.6 
Western Europe  29.5 19.5  75.9  50.4  72.4  51.5  71.2  51.9 
Central Europe  2.6 2.2  7.7  6.8  8.2  6.7  8.1  6.7 
Japan  43.3 32.4 114.6  86.9  113.1  86.9  111.5 87.4 
China  2.4 0.9  7.7  3.1  7.8  3.1  7.6  3.1 
Indonesia  1.6 0.7  5.0  2.1  5.0  2.1  4.7  2.1 
Other East Asia  5.5 2.5 19.1  8.9  19.3  8.9  18.6 9.0 
India  0.7 0.4  1.8  1.0  1.8  1.0  1.8  1.0 
Other South Asia  0.8 0.3  1.5  0.7  1.6  0.7  1.6  0.7 
South America  11.5  4.4 25.0 10.1 25.0 10.1  23.8  10.2 
Mid East Nth Afr 20.1 2.8  39.3  5.5  38.5  5.5  31.4  5.8 
Sub-Saharan Afr  12.7 0.9  23.6  1.6  23.7  1.6  19.2  1.7 
Rest of World  6.2 3.1 14.2  7.2  15.2  7.0  14.6 7.1 
      Source:  The base line columns are from Table 3 and the projections are constructed using the model described in the text. 






Table 11:  Effects of Expanded Skilled Migration on Real GNP per Capita 
 
% departure from  base line, 2030   
M1 M2 
Australia -0.5  -0.4 
North America  0.6  1.8 
Western Europe  0.0  0.2 
Central Europe & FSU  0.3  0.2 
Japan 0.3  0.6 
China 0.4  1.0 
Indonesia 0.4  0.8 
Other East Asia  0.3  0.9 
India 0.1  0.2 
Other South Asia  -0.3  -0.1 
South America  0.0  0.8 
Mid East & Nth Africa  0.5  4.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.1  5.5 
Rest of World  0.0  0.5 
    Source: The base line and M1 and M2 projections described in the text.   46
Appendix 1: Regional Composition 
 
1. AUSTRALIA  
 
2. REST OF WORLD (RoW) 
Afghanistan Albania  Andorra    Anguila  Antigua & Barbuda   Aruba  Bahamas  Barbados  
Belize  Bermuda   Bosnia and Herzegovina  Brunei  British Virgin Islands  
Cambodia   Croatia  Cyprus   Cayman Islands Costa  Rica  Cuba  Dominica     
Dominican Republic  El Salvador  Faroe Islands    Federated States of Micronesia  
Fiji French  Polynesia  Grenada  Guatemala  Gibraltar    Greenland  Guadeloupe    Haiti 
Honduras   Jamaica  Kiribati  Lao People’s Democratic Republic  Macau    Malta 
Marshall Islands  Monaco  Mongolia   Myanmar   Nauru  New Caledonia  Netherlands Antilles 
New Zealand  Nicaragua  Panama  Papua New Guinea   Saint Kitts and Nevis  Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  San Marino   Solomon Islands   The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia  
Tonga   Trinidad and Tobago  Tuvalu  Vanuatu   Western  Samoa  Yugoslavia 
 
3. CHINA 




5. EAST ASIA 






8. OTHER SOUTH ASIA (OS_ASIA) 
Bangladesh  Bhutan   Maldives   Nepal   Pakistan     Sri  Lanka   
 
9. NORTH AMERICA (NAM) 
American Samoa  Canada    Guam  Mexico  Northern Mariana Islands 
United States of America   
 
10. SOUTH AMERICA (SAM) 
Argentina    Bolivia   Brazil  Chile    Colombia   Ecuador   Peru   
Venezuela Uruguay   
 
11. WESTERN EUROPE (WEU) 
Belgium   Denmark   Finland   France    French  Guiana  Germany   Greece 
Iceland   Ireland   Italy     Leichtenstein Luxembourg   Martinique
 Netherlands 
Norway     Portugal   Reunion   Spain Sweden    Switzerland   
United  Kingdom     
 
12. CENTRAL EUROPE & FORMER USSR (CEU_FSU) 
Armenia   Azerbaijan  Belarus   Bulgaria Czech Republic  Estonia  Georgia  Hungary  Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan   Latvia    Lithuania   Poland    Republic of Moldova  Romania 
Russian Federation   Slovakia   Slovenia  Tajikistan Turkmenistan Ukraine  Uzbekistan 
 
13. MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA (ME_NA) 
Algeria Bahrain Egypt    Iraq  Islamic  Republic of Iran  Israel  Jordan  Kuwait   
Lebanon Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  Morocco Oman Qatar  Saudi  Arabia  Syrian Arab Republic 
Tunisia   Turkey  United Arab Emirates   Yemen   
 
14. SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (SSAFR) 
Angola Benin  Botswana    Burkina  Faso  Burundi  Cameroon  Cape Verde  Central African 
Republic Chad  Comoros   Congo  Cote d'Ivoire Djibouti    Equatorial  Guinea  Eritrea 
Ethiopia Gabon  Gambia    Ghana    Guinea   Guinea-Bissau   Kenya 
Lesotho Liberia  Madagascar  Mali  Malawi Mauritania Mauritius    Mayotte  Mozambique   
Namibia   Niger  Nigeria  Rwanda    Sao Tome and Principe Senegal  Seychelles   
Sierra Leone  Somalia    Sudan South  Africa  Swaziland Tanzania   Togo 
Uganda    Zaire   Zambia     Zimbabwe 